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Abstract
In this study, we consider research and development investment
by the government. Our study is motivated by the bias in the budget
allocation owing to the competitive funding system. In our model,
each researcher presents research plans and expenses, and the gov-
ernment selects a research plan in two periods—before and after the
government knows its favorite plan—and spends funds on the adopted
program in each period. We demonstrate that, in a subgame perfect
equilibrium, the government adopts equally as many active plans as
possible. In an equilibrium, the selected plans are distributed pro-
portionally. Thus, the investment in research projects is symmetric
and unbiased. Our results imply that equally widespread expenditure
across all research fields is better than the selection of and concentra-
tion in some specific fields.
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1 Introduction
In Japan, since 1995, research and development (R&D) investment by the
government has been promoted by the Science and Technology Basic Plan,
which is a five-year plan of the Japanese government. Currently, the plan
has entered its fifth phase, with its latest version issued in 2016. At the same
time, the government’s expenditure is bound by the Act on Special Measures
Concerning Promotion of Fiscal Structural Reform (Act No. 109 of 1997). In
particular, subject to the provisions of Article 25 Paragraph 2 of the Act, the
government should promote the selection of R&D investment and improve
its efficiency by appropriately evaluating the results and reflecting them in
its budget allocation. That is, the government focuses on the selection of and
concentration in some specific fields. Although the Japanese government has
recognized the role of government investment in ensuring long-term growth
of the economy, it adopts policies of selection and concentration owing to
financial problems. Policymakers want to have the ability to identify a win-
ning lottery in advance. We consider the best policy for the government in
this situation.
We consider R&D investment by the government. Theoretically, we ex-
tend the work of Ishii and Nakagawa (2015)[13]. In our model, the govern-
ment is an investor to whom researchers pitch their plans. Each researcher
presents his or her research plans along with the corresponding expenses, and
the government selects a research plan in each of two periods—before and af-
ter the government knows its favorite plan—and spends funds on the adopted
program in each period. The optimal research outcome for the government
is not known “ex ante” before the government knows its favorite plan, while
it is known “ex post” after the government knows its favorite plan. In other
words, the government does not know the number of winning lots in advance
but learns it in the aftermath of a situation. Here, we consider national ex-
penditure on research to denote government’s “purchase” of a research plan,
as the cost of research for the government is the “price” of research for the
researchers. In addition, our model distinguishes between “purchases” and
“consumption.” Although the government spends funds on various types of
academic research, except for ideal research, the government later discards
it, regarding it as useless for the nation after learning its favorite plan. In
other words, purchase of unconsumed research by the government results
only in incurred costs as this research is useless and its consumption does
not generate any positive utility.
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We analyze the variety of research that is determined endogenously and
the degree of differentiation in research projects across the varieties. We
demonstrate that, in a subgame perfect equilibrium, the investment in re-
search projects is symmetric and unbiased. In other words, the government’s
expenditure is spread out over all scientific fields. In a subgame perfect equi-
librium, the selected plans are distributed proportionally. It is optimal for
the government to purchase as many active plans as possible. Our results
imply that equally widespread expenditure across all research fields is better
than the selection of and concentration in some specific fields. In addition,
we calculate the optimal variety at equilibrium, which is the optimal number
of research projects for the government.
2 Model
Each researcher i chooses once simultaneously his or her own “location” of
characteristic, and then chooses twice simultaneously a “price” for the plan.
Researchers set the characteristics and prices of their research plans ex ante
and then set their prices again ex post. Between ex ante and ex post, t, the
ideal point of the government is realized. Z = (z1, z2, . . . , zn) denotes the
characteristic vector of the researchers’ plans. A researcher i(= 1, 2, . . . , n)
chooses zi in the interval [0, 1], which is his or her plan’s characteristic. Let
pi denote the price of the researcher’s plan with characteristic zi. Here, we
define pi : Z → [0,∞).
The government selects a research plan in two periods—before, b, and
after, a, the government knows its favorite plan—and spends funds on the
adopted program in each period. The government chooses a subset I ⊆ M ,
where M denotes the whole set of the research plan M = {1, 2, · · · , n}. We
define the government’s utility u as u¯ − (t − zi)
2 − (total expenditure for
adopted plans) if researcher i’s plan is adopted. E[(t − zi)
2] is the govern-
ment’s expected utility loss when it adopts plans before its ideal points are
known. We assume that u¯ is large enough for the government to adopt at
least one research plan. This utility function is consistent with Ishii and
Nakagawa (2015)[13].
Each researcher obtains a fund when his or her plan is accepted. Re-
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searcher i’s gain pii is
pii =


pbi if they are adopted ex ante,
pai if they are adopted ex post,
0 if they are not adopted.
3 Ex-Post Price Game
After the government’s ideal point t is realized, we can classify its realization
in the interval [0, 1] into the following three cases: (1) 0 ≤ t ≤ z1, (2) zi ≤
t ≤ zi+1, (1 ≤ i ≤ n−1), and (3) zn ≤ t ≤ 1. Here, without loss of generality,
we focus on the case in which t is realized in zi ≤ t ≤ (zi + zi+1)/2 ≤ zi+1.
In other words, for simplicity, we assume that zi is the closest point from the
realized t. In this case, the government’s most preferred plan is zi. Thus,
the government will not need any more plans ex post if they already have a
plan, zi, before they find their ideal point, t.
Next, we consider the case in which the government does not have the
most favorite plan, zi, ex ante. In this scenario, we have to consider the
following two cases: one in which the government has already chosen one or
more plans but has not chosen plan zi ex ante, and the other in which the
government chooses no plan ex ante. In addition, the former is divided into
two scenarios: first, the government already has zi+1 and, second, it does not
have zi+1.
First, the government does not have plan zi ex ante, that is, it has not an
ideal plan. Suppose that among the government’s adopted plans in advance,
in terms of characteristics, plan zj 6= zi is the closest to the government’s
realized ideal point t. Now, we show that the unique equilibrium outcome
in this case is that the government adopts an additional plan zi ex post. To
that end, we have to demonstrate that the government does not choose any
plans except for zi in the ex-post price subgame, that is, no plan except zi is
demanded ex post.
At equilibrium, the government purchases its most preferred plan zi at
a price equal to the margin of transportation cost in both cases wherein
zj = zi+1 and zj 6= zi+1. Roughly speaking, the government discards the
losing lot and repurchases the winning lottery. Now, we assume that the
government already has plan zj ex ante when zi is closest to its ideal point,
which is realized ex post. In addition, we assume that the government already
has zj = zi+1 for the time being.
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Using a proof by contradiction, suppose that the government does not
adopt an additional plan zi at the equilibrium, and then it chooses plan
zj 6= zi, which is second-closest to the government’s realized ideal point t in
terms of the characteristics at that time. The government’s utility is
u− (t− zj)
2 − (total expenditure ex ante). (1)
On the contrary, if the government adopts plan zi with p
a
i ex post, its utility
is
u− (t− zi)
2 − pai − (total expenditure ex ante). (2)
When pai satisfies the following condition
pai < (t− zj)
2 − (t− zi)
2, (3)
the government’s ex-post utility is strictly improved. On the contrary, re-
searcher i’s profit is strictly improved if the government chooses it with a
positive pai when its price changes such that (3) holds. This is in contradic-
tion to the fact that the government does not adopt an additional plan zi at
the equilibrium. In other words, the government discards the losing lot zj
and repurchases the winning lottery zi at the equilibrium.
Next, we consider the case in which the government already has plan j
with characteristic zj 6= zi+1, for example, zj = zi−1. In this case, compared
to zj = zi+1, every zj 6= zi+1 is strictly far away from zi. Now, we check
that, at an ex-post equilibrium, the government does not choose zk, which
meets the following condition: (t− zi)
2 < (t− zk)
2 < (t− zj)
2. Suppose that
the government additionally purchases plan k 6= i at an ex-post equilibrium.
It obtains u − (t − zk)
2 − pak − (total expenditure at ex ante). On the other
hand, when the government additionally purchases plan i, it obtains u− (t−
zi)
2 − pai − (total expenditure at ex ante). Now, at this ex-post equilibrium,
the following holds:
pai ≥ (t− zk)
2 − (t− zi)
2 + pak, (4)
This is because the government chooses k and not i. However, i has the
incentive to change its price from pai to p
a′
i such that
pa′i < (t− zk)
2 − (t− zi)
2 + pak. (5)
Thus, the government additionally purchases the best-fitted plan i at an
ex-post equilibrium.
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Thus, we find that, after the government finds that the characteristic of
the plan possessed by the government is not best fitted to the realized ideal
point t, the government purchases an additional plan that is closest to its
realized ideal point t. Moreover, we also find that, when the government has
no plan in advance, it chooses a plan that is the closest to its realized ideal
point t after it learns its ideal point.
Finally, we calculate the ex-post equilibrium price pa∗i . As mentioned
previously, we have to consider the two cases in which the government already
has plan zj = zi+1 or zj 6= zi+1 when it has plan j with zj . We obtain the
ex-post equilibrium price as follows: pa∗i = (t−zi+1)
2− (t−zi)
2 and pa∗i+1 = 0.
It is the best response for researcher i to charge an ex-post price pai such
that pai ≤ (t − zi+1)
2 − (t − zi)
2 + pai+1 holds. In other words, researcher i
sets its price as high as the government can afford. In particular, researcher
i charges a price pai that is equal to the price at which the government is
indifferent between plan zi and plan zi+1, whose characteristic is closest to
plan zi. Thus, we obtain p
a∗
i = (t− zi+1)
2 − (t− zi)
2 + pai+1.
Next, we find that pa∗i+1 = 0. Suppose that p
a
i+1 > 0. This presents a
contradiction. This is because researcher i+ 1 can charge price pai+1 − ε > 0
to obtain more profits, thus making the government choose the plan. Thus,
we obtain pa∗i+1 = 0. This yields p
a∗
i = (t − zi+1)
2 − (t − zi)
2. Furthermore,
given the price pair, when the government chooses i’s plan, no plan deviates
from this price pair. Thus, we find that this pair is the equilibrium price pair
ex post.
The previous discussion with regard to zj = zi+1 that is presented in this
section applies to the case of zj 6= zi+1. We can set p
a∗
j = 0 that is second-
closest to the government’s realized ideal point t in terms of characteristics.
Thus, we obtain
pa∗i = (t− zi+1)
2 − (t− zi)
2. (6)
4 Ex-Ante Price Game
In particular, on a realized path of equilibrium, all researchers set the ex-
ante prices of their research plans so that they obtain profits that equal
the expected profit they would obtain ex post and the government chooses
all the plans or a part of them. In this section, we demonstrate that this
is the behavior at the equilibrium of an ex-ante price subgame, where the
researchers obtain the same expected equilibrium profit.
6
Our analysis proceeds as follows. First, we demonstrate that it is not
optimal for the government to purchase a plan that gives a researcher a
higher profit than his or her expected profit ex post. Next, we demonstrate
that when a researcher charges a price lower than his or her expected profit
ex post, a unique best response for the government is to purchase the re-
searcher’s plans. In other words, the government does not choose a plan that
is relatively high in price, but chooses a plan with a relatively low price. Fi-
nally, none of the researchers set their prices lower than their expected profit
obtained in the ex-post price game. In summary, we demonstrate that the
government chooses all the plans or a part of them for which researchers set
the prices ex ante such that they obtain a profit equal to the expected profit
ex post.
Using the equilibrium price in the ex-post price subgame, we obtain the
ex-post equilibrium profit as follows:
pia∗i = p
a∗
i = max{0,min{(t− zi−1)
2, (t− zi+1)
2} − (t− zi)
2} (7)
=


(t− zi−1)
2 − (t− zi)
2 if zi−1+zi
2
≤ t ≤ zi−1+zi+1
2
,
(t− zi+1)
2 − (t− zi)
2 if zi−1+zi+1
2
≤ t ≤ zi+zi+1
2
,
0 if 0 ≤ t ≤ zi−1+zi
2
or zi+zi+1
2
≤ t ≤ 1.
Furthermore, by pia∗i = 0, we find that those who are not adopted will not
gain a positive profit. Thus, without loss of generality, we assume that these
prices are pa∗i = 0.
First, we assume that the following equation holds:
pbi > E[pi
a∗
i ] =
∫ zi+zi+1
2
zi−1+zi
2
pa∗i dt
=
∫ zi−1+zi+1
2
zi−1+zi
2
(t− zi−1)
2dt +
∫ zi+zi+1
2
zi−1+zi+1
2
(t− zi+1)
2dt−
∫ zi+zi+1
2
zi−1+zi
2
(t− zi)
2dt.
(8)
This equation implies that pbi , an ex-ante price of i ∈M\I, is higher than the
expectation of pa∗i . Note that the right hand side of (8) shows the expected
cost for the government.
When the government decides to adopt plan i with pbi , by this equation
(8), we find that its cost is strictly higher than when the government decides
not to adopt plan i with pbi . Thus, it is not appropriate for the government
to adopt plan i ex ante.
Similarly, we find that it is appropriate for the government to adopt plan
i ∈M\I, which suggests an ex-ante price pbi such that
pbi <
∫ zi−1+zi+1
2
zi−1+zi
2
(t−zi−1)
2dt+
∫ zi+zi+1
2
zi−1+zi+1
2
(t−zi+1)
2dt−
∫ zi+zi+1
2
zi−1+zi
2
(t−zi)
2dt. (9)
This is because, if they were to add i to I ex ante, they would obtain a higher
utility than in this case.
Next, we show that given the government’s best-response behavior, no i
has an incentive to suggest pbi lower than his or her ex-post profit:
∫ zi+zi+1
2
zi−1+zi
2
pa∗i dt =
∫ zi−1+zi+1
2
zi−1+zi
2
(t−zi−1)
2dt+
∫ zi+zi+1
2
zi−1+zi+1
2
(t−zi+1)
2dt−
∫ zi+zi+1
2
zi−1+zi
2
(t−zi)
2dt.
(10)
If i charges pbi such that
pbi <
∫ zi−1+zi+1
2
zi−1+zi
2
(t−zi−1)
2dt+
∫ zi+zi+1
2
zi−1+zi+1
2
(t−zi+1)
2dt−
∫ zi+zi+1
2
zi−1+zi
2
(t−zi)
2dt (11)
holds, which is strictly lower than his or her ex-post profit, then the govern-
ment adopts it ex ante. i obtains a profit equal to pbi . However, if i were to
deviate to another pb′i ex ante such that
pb′i >
∫ zi−1+zi+1
2
zi−1+zi
2
(t−zi−1)
2dt+
∫ zi+zi+1
2
zi−1+zi+1
2
(t−zi+1)
2dt−
∫ zi+zi+1
2
zi−1+zi
2
(t−zi)
2dt (12)
holds, then the government would not adopt it ex ante. Plan i’s profit would
strictly increase. The researcher obtains
∫ zi−1+zi+1
2
zi−1+zi
2
(t− zi−1)
2dt +
∫ zi+zi+1
2
zi−1+zi+1
2
(t− zi+1)
2dt−
∫ zi+zi+1
2
zi−1+zi
2
(t− zi)
2dt. (13)
Thus, we find that the ex-ante price pbi that (11) holds is not optimal ex ante.
Finally, we demonstrate that at equilibrium, all the plans indicate pbi such
that
pbi ≥
∫ zi−1+zi+1
2
zi−1+zi
2
(t−zi−1)
2dt+
∫ zi+zi+1
2
zi−1+zi+1
2
(t−zi+1)
2dt−
∫ zi+zi+1
2
zi−1+zi
2
(t−zi)
2dt (14)
8
holds. Then, the government adopts all the plans or some of them from
among those with prices that satisfy this formula (14) holding an equal sign.
Furthermore, we find that the condition of the ex-ante price is that an
expected net loss is defined as the difference between the realized ideal point
and the characteristics of the plans purchased by the government.
The expected utility of the government is lower when it adopts i’s plan
that suggests a price such that pbi is strictly higher than the right-hand side
of equation (14). Moreover, whether the government adopts plan i that has
a price such that pbi equals the right-hand side of equation (14), its expected
utility does not change. Thus, we find that this action is the government’s
best response to research plans described by equation (14).
At the same time, it is not a best response for researcher i to reduce
his or her price ex ante in order to be adopted ex ante, because his or her
expected profit would be lower. Meanwhile, when the researcher raises the
price of his or her plan, the expected profit would not change because the
government does not adopt the plan ex ante. Thus, they do not deviate from
the price profile given by equation (14). In addition, those whose plans are
not adopted do not change their prices ex ante because it does not increase
their profit. Thus, they do not deviate from this profile.
We calculate the expected equilibrium price pairs as follows. Note that
both ends 1 and N are particular cases because now we consider the [0,1]
line.

pb∗1 =
1
12
[4z32 − (z2 − z1)
3 − 4z31 ],
pb∗i =
1
12
[(zi+1 − zi−1)
3 − (zi+1 − zi)
3 − (zi − zi−1)
3], 2 ≤ i ≤ n− 1,
pb∗n =
1
12
[4(1− zn−1)
3 − (zn − zn−1)
3 − 4(1− zn)
3].
(15)
2 ≤ i ≤ n− 1.
5 Location Game
In this section, we solve the characteristic choice of research plans. Hereafter,
we call this the location game. By equation (15), we obtain pii : (2 ≤ i ≤
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n− 1) as follows.
pii = pi =
1
12
[(zi+1 − zi−1)
3 − (zi+1 − zk)
3 − (zk − zi−1)
3]
=
(zi−1 − zi+1)
4
[
zi −
zi+1 + zi−1
2
]2
− (
zi−1 − zi+1
16
)z2i+1 − (
zi−1 − zi+1
8
)zi+1zi−1 − (
zi−1 − zi+1
16
)z2i−1 +
z2i−1zi+1 − zi−1z
2
i+1
4
(16)
From the first-order condition for profit maximization, we obtain zi =
zi+1+zi−1
2
.
Next, we consider plans 1 and n, which are located at both ends. By (15),
we obtain
pi1 =
1
12
[4z32 − (z2 − z1)
3 − 4z31 ], (17)
pin =
1
12
[4(1− zn−1)
3 − (zn − zn−1)
3 − 4(1− zn)
3]. (18)
From the first-order conditions for this maximization problem, we obtain

z2 = 3z1,
. . .
zi+1 − zi = zi − zi−1,
. . .
3zn = zn−1 + 2.
We find that zn − zn−1 = zn−1 − zn−2 = · · · = z2 − z1 = 2z1. Thus, we
find a sequence of numbers z1, z2, . . . , zn with common difference 2z1. We
obtain the general term of this sequence as follows. Now, we find that zi =
2z1i−z1, i = 1, 2, · · · , n. Next, we find that 3zn = zn−1+2↔ 3(2z1n−z1) =
2(n− 1)z1 − z1 + 2↔ z1 =
1
2n
. Thus, we obtain
zi = 2z1i− z1 =
2i− 1
2n
i = 1, 2, · · · , n. (19)
10
Substituting zi =
2i− 1
2n
for (15), we obtain

pi1 = p1 =
1
12
[
4
(
3
2n
)3
−
(
3
2n
−
1
2n
)3
− 4
(
1
2n
)3]
,
pii = pi =
1
12
[(
2i+ 1
2n
−
2i− 3
2n
)3
−
(
2i+ 1
2n
−
2i− 1
2n
)3
−
(
2i− 1
2n
−
2i− 3
2n
)3]
,
pin = pn =
1
12
[
4
(
1−
2n− 3
2n
)3
−
(
2n− 1
2n
−
2n− 3
2n
)3
− 4
(
1−
2n− 1
2n
)3]
,
⇔


pi1 =
1
n3
,
pii =
2
n3
,
pin =
1
n3
.
(20)
Till now, we have discussed the necessary condition for a location equi-
librium. Now, we check the incentive for a researcher l (1 ≤ l ≤ n) to
deviate from the location point of the equilibrium defined by (20) to z′l ∈
[0, 1]\(zl−1, zl+1).
pi′l =
1
12
[(
1
n
)3
−
(
2i+ 1
2n
− z′l
)3
−
(
z′l −
2i− 1
2n
)3]
<
1
12n3
< pil
Next, we check whether any researcher l deviates to a point such that z′l ∈
[0, z1).
pi′l =
1
12
[
4
(
1
2n
)3
−
(
1
2n
− z′l
)3
− 4z′3l
]
=
1
24n3
< pil
Thus, we find that no researcher l deviates. We obtain the location points of
the equilibrium as follows:
z∗i =
2i− 1
2n
i = 1, 2, · · · , n. (21)
6 Diversity of Research Plans
In this section, we consider the so-called zero profit condition in our model
to obtain product diversity. In the previous section, we assume that fixed
11
cost F = 0. In other words, under the assumption of F = 0, every research
plan adopted can be implemented and a positive outcome can be attained
at equilibrium. However, if some fixed cost F > 0 is needed before a plan is
initiated, then some plans might not be executable because the government
cannot afford the fixed cost. For example, it might be necessary for the
government to invest in large equipment in advance because the project fund
can afford only running costs during the research period. Salop (1979)[20]
calculates the optimal product diversity in the context of spatial competition.
First, we assume that every researcher can gain a reservation value, 0,
when the researcher does not undertake his or her research. In this case, we
consider a stage at which everyone deliberates whether he or she will apply
for government support. At this stage, when researchers consider that their
plans generate a loss because of some positive fixed cost F , they stop applying
for the contest. We consider a simultaneous move game before researchers
choose the locations of their research plans. In this game, there are many
potential researchers who have research plans, and they choose whether to
enter this competition. If they choose not to enter, they obtain 0. Entrants
i = 1, 2, . . . , n play the two-stage game outlined in the previous section. We
define each i’s profit as follows:
pi1 =
1
n3
− F,
pii =
2
n3
− F, i = 2, 3, . . . , n− 1,
pin =
1
n3
− F.
Based on these profits, each researcher decides whether to submit his or her
plans. In a straightforward calculation, we find that it is necessary for the
researchers’ profits at both the ends, 1, n, to be non-negative. We define n∗
as the number of operating researchers at equilibrium.
We obtain the following result by solving the zero-profit condition. Note
that we assume that a new entrant n∗+1 is located at both the ends; that is,
its location number is automatically adjusted. At equilibrium, the optimal
number of research plans is as follows:

n∗ = 3
√
1
F
, or 3
√
1
F
− 1, if
[
3
√
1
F
]
= 3
√
1
F
,
n∗ =
[
3
√
1
F
]
, otherwise.
(22)
Here, [x] is the largest integer that does not exceed x.
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7 Concluding Remarks
In this study, we consider R&D investment by the government. In our model,
there are two subgame perfect equilibria. One is that the government invests
in as many plans as it can afford in advance. The other is that the government
invests in no plan in advance, and then it invests in only its favorite plan after
finding its ideal point. Anyway, it is optimal for the government to invest in
all the plans ex ante. More adoption improves the chance of winning a lottery.
In other words, our results imply that equally widespread expenditure across
all research fields is better than the selection of and concentration in some
specific fields. At the same time, it is important to cut down on red tape as
much as possible. By (22), we obtain dn∗/dF < 0. Equation (22) shows the
number of adopted research plans for the government. This shows that less
fixed cost, F , is better. This cost includes the cost of office work to make
a proposal and to execute a project. This result implies that it is necessary
to reduce these administration costs that are required to be paid by the
government.
Finally, we discuss the factors of negative outcomes for the current sit-
uation in Japan. Recently, economic growth has become the main purpose
of Japan’s science and technology policy. According to Science and Tech-
nology Indicators 2017[19], the total sum of R&D expenditure by both the
public and private sectors in Japan in 2015 was 18.9 trillion yen (US$ 170
billion). About 20 years ago, the Japanese government formulated a five-year
plan called the Science and Technology Basic Plan (Kagaku Gijyutu Kihon
Keikaku). Currently, the plan has entered its fifth phase, with its latest
version issued in 2016. In the current Fifth Basic Plan, science and tech-
nology policy is strongly promoted as a major policy for the development of
the Japanese economy, which has been suffering from a long recession. The
government is seeking innovation that is directly linked to economic growth.
Moreover, the government is trying to build processes for dynamic innovation
by which R&D findings in one area can be applied to other areas appropri-
ately. The outcome of the government’s R & D investment has two aspects,
namely, an outcome useful for the government and a universal achievement
for academia. There have been some changes in research expenses in national
universities; research funds in natural sciences have increased for both theory
and applied development over the past two decades. Despite this trend, with
the expansion of R&D by other countries, as per influential papers (Top 10%;
Top 1% papers), Japan declined from the fourth to 10th place in the past
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decade. According to Benchmarking of Scientific Research 2017 that is in-
cluded in Science and Technology Indicators 2017, the growth in the number
of papers by national universities, which accounts for 50% of the papers in
Japan, has been sluggish since the middle of the 2000s. The promotion of
selection and concentration over two decades might have resulted in negative
outcomes for research today.
At last we review the literature on R&D investment in economics. Follow-
ing the concepts of economics, innovation often creates monopolies with enor-
mous profits, but these gains also provide the incentive for firms to develop
new products and processes through R&D. In macroeconomics, relationships
between diversity and innovation are the driving force for economic growth;
for example, see Aghion and Howitt (1992)[1] and Grossman and Helpman
(1994)[10]. Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)[7] provide a microeconomic foundation
for the endogenous growth theory. Additional, see Romer (1990)[18] and
Grossman and Helpman (1991)[9]. Monopolistic competition plays an impor-
tant role in the context of innovation and growth. For example, city growth is
well captured by this framework. Topics related to cities and agglomerations
in urban economics are closely related to economic growth. For example,
Behrens et al. (2014)[5] theoretically and empirically analyzed details on
city growth based on the Dixit–Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition.
On the other hand, how well the monopolistic market works depends
on complementarity, that is, flexibility and receptivity. See Matsuyama
(1995)[15] for details on the relationship between complementarity and cu-
mulative processes in the Dixit–Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition.
Furthermore, R&D investments provide numerous research topics within eco-
nomics. In the context of R&D, companies themselves are entrepreneurs that
earn profits by themselves, which is typical of Dixit and Stiglitz’s monopolis-
tic competitive firms. There are several studies considering optimal competi-
tive strategy in this situation, that is, the appropriate timing and investment
amount of R&D in competition with other companies. A wide variety of liter-
ature in economics relates competition to investment in innovation. Although
R&D research is diverse, filed of industrial organization plays a key role in
this context. The relationship between the market structure and incentives
to invest in R&D has been studied widely in economics. For example, with
regard to cost-reducing innovation, Arrow (1962)[3] finds that a monopolistic
firm faces the replacement effect. Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980)[6], Aghion
and Tirole (1994)[2], and Vives (2008)[21] analyze the incentives for firms
to introduce new and improved products. Gilbert and Newbery (1982)[8]
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point out that preemptive patenting enables firms to protect their market
power. As regards the influence of patents on R&D, see, for instance, Katz
and Shapiro (1986)[14]. Milgrom and Roberts (1990, 1995)[16, 17] provide
a theory of complementarity between different activities of the firm, directly
applied to the complementarity of firms’ innovation activities. With the re-
cent development of structural estimation, research has been shifting from
theoretical to empirical studies; see, for example, Igami (2017)[12]. The mi-
croeconomic foundation of economic growth has become more complicated
than what has been assumed previously; for example, Dixit and Stiglitz’s mo-
nopolistic competition. Furthermore, although many economists agree that
the relationship between diversity and innovation is the driving force for eco-
nomic growth, mere recognition would imply the promotion of selection and
concentration in some specific fields.
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